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“Insurance plays a vital role in America’s economy by helping households and businesses manage risks. (…)   
When insurance prices reflect underlying economic costs they can encourage a more efficient allocation of 
resources. Efforts to keep premiums for insurance against catastrophe hazards artificially low, whether through 
regulation or through subsidized government programs, can encourage excessively risky behavior  
on the part of those who might be affected by future catastrophes.” 
Economic Report of the President (2007), pp.122-123
2 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Given the hundreds of billions of dollars of economic losses due to catastrophes that occurred in 
the United States since 2001, it is difficult to realize that when Hurricane Hugo hit the country in 
1989, it was the first catastrophe to inflict more than $1 billion of insured losses. But times have 
changed because of the occurrence of a series of unprecedented large-scale natural disasters that 
have hit the United States repeatedly in the past few years. Times have changed because of the 
increased terrorism threat worldwide including the potential for nuclear attacks. Times have 
changed because of the possibility of international pandemics, world cyber-failure and the 
financial crises we are currently experiencing. In other words, we have entered a new era of 
catastrophes. 
While all the above risks are different in character, they have several important features 
in common: uncertainty and wide variance in losses from one year to the next. Experts and 
decision makers face challenges in assessing the risks associated with these extreme events, 
developing strategies for reducing future losses and facilitating the recovery process following a 
major catastrophe.  
Turning to natural disasters, the world has experienced large-scale losses and fatalities 
due to the increasing concentration of population and activities in high-risk coastal regions of the 
country. In southeast Asia, the tsunami in December 2004 killed more than 280,000 people 
residing in coastal areas. Cyclone Nargis, which made landfall in Myanmar in May 2008, killed 
an estimated 140,000 people, making it the deadliest natural disaster in the recorded history of 
the country. The same month, the Great Sichuan Earthquake in China is estimated to have killed 
nearly 70,000 people, 374,000 were injured, and almost five million were made homeless. 
(Munich Re, 2008).  
But even in a developed country like the United States, which has extensive experience 
with natural catastrophes and resources to adequately prepare, the 2004 and 2005 hurricane 
seasons have demonstrated the lack of adequate loss reduction measures and emergency 
preparedness capacity to deal with large-scale natural disasters. Hurricane Katrina, which hit 
Louisiana and Mississippi at the end of August 2005, killed 1,300 people and forced 1.5 million 
people to evacuate the affected area – a historic record for the country. Economic damages are 
estimated in the range of US$150 to US$200 billion.  
                                           
2 It is quite remarkable that 2007 was the first year that the Economic Report of the President devoted a chapter to 
catastrophe risk insurance.  
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After two relatively quiet hurricane seasons in 2006 and 2007 in the United States, a 
series of hurricanes made landfall in 2008, causing billions of dollars in direct economic losses 
along the Caribbean Basin and in the United States. Hurricane Ike was the most expensive 
individual event in 2008 with an estimated privately insured loss of $16 billion, followed by 
Hurricane Gustav with insured losses estimated at $4 billion. Based on these figures, Hurricane 
Ike ranks as the third most devastating weather-related disaster in U.S. history, after Hurricane 
Katrina and Hurricane Andrew which hit southeast Florida in August 1992. (Swiss Re, 2008).   
These recent catastrophes highlight the challenges of mitigating and financing natural 
disasters, issues that are now high on the business and policy agendas of many countries. The 
question is not whether other large-scale catastrophes will occur, but when and how frequently 
they will strike, and the extent of the damage and fatalities they will cause. Now is the time to 
develop and implement economically sound policies and strategies for managing the risk and 
consequences of future disasters. It is important for us to take a longer term view of these issues 
given the tendency for individuals to be myopic in their thinking and to misperceive risks. A 
coherent strategy is necessary to ensure a sustainable recovery from large-scale disasters and the 
appropriate future development of hazard-prone areas. But these issues are complex. They 
challenge our capacity as a nation to work together despite different agendas of key stakeholders 
and legislators regarding the role and responsibilities of the private and public sectors in dealing 
with catastrophic risks. Absence of leadership in this area will inevitably lead to unnecessary loss 
of lives and economic destruction in the devastated regions.  
This paper complements other analyses in this volume by focusing on the risk of large-
scale natural disasters, although we believe the concepts and proposals for managing these risks 
more effectively have relevance to other types of extreme events such as terrorism and 
catastrophic accidents.
3 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the evolution over 
the past four decades of economic and insured losses due to major catastrophes and the key 
drivers of this change. Section 3 proposes four guiding principles for developing sustainable 
insurance and mitigation programs. Section 4 focuses on the behavioral biases, notably myopia, 
that discourage individuals from investing in cost effective protective measures. Section 5 
proposes long-term insurance contracts combined with long-term loans for overcoming these 
biases. The National Flood Insurance Program, which is due for renewal/changes by Congress in 
September 2009, is a natural candidate for these contracts as discussed in Section 6. The paper 
concludes with a brief summary and suggestions for future research.  
                                           
3 For a detailed analysis on terrorism insurance by the authors, see Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2004), Wharton 
Risk Center (2005), Michel-Kerjan and Pedell (2006) and Michel-Kerjan et al. (2009). For a detailed analysis of the 
question of natural disaster insurance and mitigation in the United States, see Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009). 4 
 
2. A New Era of Catastrophes 
Recent Changes in the Impacts of Extreme Events 
The economic and insured losses from great natural catastrophes such as hurricanes, earthquakes 
and floods worldwide have increased significantly in recent years, as shown in figure 1 (each 
vertical bar represents the total economic losses, and the darker zone represents the insured 
portion of it). A comparison of these economic losses over time reveals a huge increase: $53.6 
billion (1950–1959), $93.3 billion (1960–1969), $161.7 billion (1970–1979), $262.9 billion 
(1980–1989), and $778.3 billion (1990–1999). Between 2000 and 2008, there were $620.6 
billion in losses, principally a result of the 2004, 2005 and 2008 hurricane seasons, which 
produced historic records.  
 
FIGURE 1.  EVOLUTION OF “GREAT NATURAL CATASTROPHES” WORLDWIDE, 1950-2007  
Sources: Data from Munich Re, 2008 Geo Risks Research – in U.S. $ billon indexed to 2007 
Catastrophes have had a more devastating impact on insurers since 1990 than in the entire 
history of insurance. Between 1970 and the mid-1980s, annual insured losses from natural 
disasters (including forest fires) were in the $3 billion to $4 billion range. The insured losses 
from Hurricane Hugo, which made landfall in Charleston, South Carolina in September, 1989, 
exceeded $4 billion (1989 prices). There was a radical increase in insured losses in the early 
1990s, with Hurricane Andrew in Florida ($23.7 billion in 2007 dollars) and the Northridge 
earthquake in California ($19.6 billion in 2007 dollars). The four hurricanes in Florida in 2004 
(Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne) collectively totaled almost $33 billion in insured losses. 
Hurricane Katrina alone cost insurers and reinsurers an estimated $46 billion, with total losses 
paid by private insurers resulting from major natural catastrophes in 2005 at $87 billion.
4  
                                           
4 This figure excludes payment by the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) for damage due to 2005 
flooding (over $20 billion in claims). 5 
 
Figure 2 depicts the upward trend in worldwide insured losses from catastrophes between 
1970 and 2008.
5  
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Table 1 reveals the twenty most costly catastrophes for the insurance sector from 1970 to 
2007 (in 2007 dollars). Of these twenty major events, ten have occurred since 2001, nine of which 
were in the United States. Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake were the first two 
catastrophes that the industry experienced where losses were greater than $10 billion (designated 
as super-cats) and caused insurers to reflect on whether risks from natural disasters were still 
insurable. To assist them in making this determination, many firms began using catastrophe 
models to estimate the likelihood and consequences to their insured portfolios from specific 
disasters in hazard-prone areas (Grossi and Kunreuther, 2005). With the exception of the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001, all of the events in the top twenty were natural disasters.
7 More 
than 80 percent of these were weather-related events—hurricanes and typhoons, storms, and 
floods—with nearly three-quarters of the claims in the United States. 
                                           
5 Munich Re and Swiss Re, the two leading reinsurers in the world, do not use the same definition of catastrophic 
losses. Natural disasters inflicting insured losses above $38.7 million or total losses above $77.5 million are 
considered major catastrophes by Swiss Re.  Munich Re considers a higher threshold, which explains the difference 
between Figure 1 and Figure 2.  For example, when Munich Re estimated insured loss from natural disasters at 
about $42 billion in 2004, Swiss Re’s estimate was over $52 billion. As a result, most figures used in the literature 
regarding the evolution of catastrophe loss actually underestimate the real effect on insurers.  
6 Man-made catastrophes include: major fires and explosions (in a chemical plant or oil refinery for instance), 
aviation/rail/shipping-related losses (fires, crashes, collisions) as well as mining accidents and collapse of 
infrastructure. 
7 See the chapter by Jaffee and Russell in this volume for a detailed discussion of terrorism insurance markets.  6 
 
 
  Losses resulting from natural catastrophes and man-made disasters in 2006 were far 
below the losses in 2004 and 2005. Of the $48 billion in catastrophe-related economic losses, 
$16 billion was covered by insurance ($11 billion for natural disasters and $5 billion for man-
made). During the past twenty years, only 1988 and 1997 had insured losses lower than those in 
2006. According to Munich Re, there were 950 natural catastrophes in 2007, the most since 
1974. They inflicted nearly $27 billion in insured losses. Swiss Re estimates that insured losses 
soared to $50 billion for the industry in 2008 making it one of the three costliest years ever.  
Natural catastrophes accounted for $43 billion of these losses with man-made disasters making 
up the remaining $7 billion. (Swiss Re, 2008). 
 
TABLE 1. THE 20 MOST COSTLY INSURED IN THE WORLD, 1970-2007  
(INDEXED TO 2007 PRICES) 
U.S.$ Billion 
(indexed  to 2007)             Event  Victims 
(Dead or  missing) Year  Area of Primary Damage 
           46.3  Hurricane Katrina  1,836 2005  USA, Gulf of Mexico, et al. 
35.5  9/11 Attacks   3,025 2001  USA 
23.7 Hurricane  Andrew  43 1992  USA, Bahamas 
19.6 Northridge  Earthquake  61 1994  USA 
14.1 Hurricane  Ivan  124 2004  USA, Caribbean, et al. 
13.3 Hurricane  Wilma  35 2005  USA, Gulf of Mexico, et al. 
10.7 Hurricane  Rita  34 2005  USA, Gulf of Mexico, et al. 
8.8 Hurricane  Charley  24 2004  USA, Caribbean, et al. 
8.6 Typhoon  Mireille  51 1991  Japan 
7.6 Hurricane  Hugo  71 1989  Puerto Rico, USA, et al. 
7.4 Winterstorm  Daria  95 1990  France, UK, et al. 
7.2 Winterstorm  Lothar  110 1999  France, Switzerland, et al. 
6.1 Winterstorm  Kyrill  54 2007  Germany, UK, NL, France 
5.7  Storms and floods  22 1987  France, UK, et al. 
5.6 Hurricane  Frances  38 2004  USA, Bahamas 
5.0 Winterstorm  Vivian  64 1990  Western/Central Europe 
5.0 Typhoon  Bart  26 1999  Japan 
4.5 Hurricane  Georges  600 1998  USA, Caribbean 
4.2  Tropical Storm Alison  41 2001  USA 
4.2 Hurricane  Jeanne  3,034 2004  USA, Caribbean, et al. 
Sources:  Wharton Risk Center with data from Swiss Re and Insurance Information Institute 
  
The occurrence of damaging hurricanes is highly variable and uncertain from year to 
year. However, it is almost certain that in the coming years more hurricanes will strike the 
Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Other parts of the nation will experience severe floods (as occurred in 
the upper Midwest in 2008) and earthquakes, causing extreme damage to residential and 
commercial property and infrastructure.   
There is a very clear message from these data. Twenty or thirty years ago, large-scale 
natural disasters were considered to be low-probability events. Today, they are not only causing 
considerably greater economic losses than in the past but also appear to be occurring at an 
accelerating pace. In this context, it is important to understand more fully the factors influencing 
these changes so as to design more effective programs for reducing losses from future disasters.  7 
 
The Question of Attribution 
There are at least two principal socio-economic factors that directly influence the level of 
economic losses due to catastrophic events: degree of urbanization and value at risk.  In 1950, 
approximately 30 percent of the world’s population lived in cities. In 2000, about 50 percent of 
the world’s population (6 billion) resided in urban areas. Projections by the United Nations show 
that by 2025, that figure will have increased to 60 percent based on a world population estimate 
of 8.3 billion people.   
In the United States in 2003, 53 percent of the nation’s population, or 153 million people, 
lived in the 673 U.S. coastal counties, an increase of 33 million people since 1980, according to 
the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration. And the nation’s coastal population is 
expected to increase by more than 12 million by 2015 (Crossett, et. al., 2004).
8 Yet coastal 
counties, excluding Alaska, account for only 17 percent of land area in the United States.  
In hazard-prone areas, this urbanization and increase of population also translates into 
greater concentration of exposure and hence a higher likelihood of catastrophic losses from future 
disasters. Insurance density is another critical socio-economic factor to consider when evaluating 
the evolution of insured loss due to weather-related catastrophes. These factors will continue to 
have a major impact on the level of insured losses from natural catastrophes. Given the growing 
concentration of exposure on the Gulf Coast, another hurricane like Katrina hitting the Gulf Coast 
is likely to inflict significant property damage unless strong mitigation measures are put in place.
9 
In order to better understand this new vulnerability, it is possible to calculate the total 
direct economic cost of the major hurricanes in the U.S. in the past century, adjusted for inflation, 
population and wealth normalization. More specifically, one can estimate what each of these 
hurricanes would have cost had they hit today. This exercise has been done in several studies. The 
most recent one by Pielke et al. (2008) normalizes to the year 2005 mainland U.S. hurricane 
damage for the period 1900–2005.  
Table 2 provides estimates for the top 20 most costly hurricanes assuming they had 
occurred in 2005 using two approaches for normalizing these losses, each of which gives a cost 
estimate. The table provides the range of costs between these two estimates, the year when the 
hurricane originally occurred, the states that were the most seriously affected and the hurricane 
category on the Saffir-Simpson scale. The data reveal that the hurricane that hit Miami in 1926 
would have been almost twice as costly as Hurricane Katrina had it occurred in 2005, and the 
Galveston hurricane of 1900 would have had total direct economic costs as high as those from 
Katrina. This means that independent of any possible change in weather patterns, we are very 
likely to see even more devastating disasters in the coming years because of the ongoing growth 
in values located in risk-prone areas.  
There is another element to consider in determining how to adequately manage and 
finance catastrophe risks; the possible impact of a change in climate on future weather-related 
catastrophes. Between 1970 and 2004, storms and floods were responsible for over 90 percent of 
                                           
8 This proportion varies depending on the definition of “coastal counties” one considers. Taking a more restrictive 
definition (that is, any county that has a coastline bordering the open ocean or associated sheltered water bodies or a 
county that contains V zones (as defined by the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program), one still finds that the 
proportion of population living in such counties is 30 percent. (Crowell et al., 2007).  
9 For additional data on the economic impact of future catastrophic hurricanes, see Financial Services Roundtable 
(2007). 8 
 
the total economic costs of extreme weather-related events worldwide. Storms (hurricanes in the 
U.S. region, typhoons in Asia and windstorms in Europe) contributed to over 75 percent of insured 
losses. In constant prices (2004), insured losses from weather-related events averaged $3 billion 
annually between 1970 and 1990 and then increased significantly to $16 billion annually between 
1990 and 2004 (Association of British Insurers, 2005). In 2005, 99.7 percent of all catastrophic 
losses worldwide were due to weather-related events (Mills and Lecomte, 2006). 
TABLE 2. TOP 20 HURRICANE SCENARIOS  (1900-2005) 
RANKED USING 2005 INFLATION, POPULATION, AND WEALTH NORMALIZATION 
Rank Hurricane  Year  Category 
Cost range 
($ billion) in 2005 
1  Miami (Southeast FL/MS/AL)  1926  4  140-157 
2 Katrina  (LA/MS)  2005  3  81 
3  North Texas (Galveston)  1900  4  72-78 
4  North Texas (Galveston)  1915  4  57-62 
5  Andrew (Southeast FL and LA)  1992  5-3  54-60 
6  New England (CT/MA/NY/RI)  1938  3  37-39 
7 Southwest  Florida  1944  3  35-39 
8  Lake Okeechobee (Southeast Florida)  1928  4  32-34 
9 Donna  (FL-NC/NY)  1960  4-3  29-32 
10  Camille (MS/Southeast LA/VA)  1969  5  21-24 
11  Betsy (Southeast FL and LA)  1965  3  21-23 
12 Wilma  2005  3  21 
13 Agnes  (FL/CT/NY)  1972  1  17-18 
14 Diane  (NC)  1955  1  17 
15 4  (Southeast  FL/LA/AL/MS)  1947  4-3  15-17 
16 Hazel  (SC/NC)  1954  4  16-23 
17  Charley (Southwest FL)  2004  4  16 
18 Carol  (CT/NY/RI)  1954  3  15-16 
19 Hugo  (SC)  1989  4  15-16 
20 Ivan  (Northwest  FL/AL)  2004  3  15 
1.   
Source: Data from Pielke et al. (2008) 
There have been numerous discussions and scientific debates as to whether the series of 
major hurricanes that occurred in 2004 and 2005 might be partially attributable to the impact of a 
change in climate.
10  One of the expected effects of global warming will be an increase in 
hurricane intensity. This has been predicted by theory and modeling, and substantiated by 
empirical data on climate change. Higher ocean temperatures lead to an exponentially higher 
evaporation rate in the atmosphere which increases the intensity of cyclones and precipitation. 
The results to date raise issues with respect to the insurability of weather-related catastrophes 
given that an increase in the number of major hurricanes over a shorter period of time is likely to 
translate into a greater number hitting the coasts, with a greater likelihood of damage to a much 
larger number of residences and commercial buildings today than in the 1940s. 
                                           
10 For more details on the scientific evidence regarding climate change and its impact see Stern Review (2006). 9 
 
The combination of increasing urbanization, concentration of value in high-risk areas, and 
the potential impact of a change in weather-patterns raises questions for the insurance industry as 
to how they will provide protection against catastrophic risks in the future. Traditional insurance 
relies on geographical and time diversification, both of which are somewhat compromised by 
these recent trends. The appropriate the roles and responsibilities of the private and public sectors 
(as a source of financial support or as market regulator) is critical in this regard.  
 
3.  Guiding Principles for Mitigating and Insuring against Catastrophes  
To address the question as to what roles the private and public sectors can play in addressing 
these issues, we propose the following guiding principles for using the insurance infrastructure to 
deal more effectively with natural disasters: 
Principle 1: Premiums Reflecting Risk: Insurance premiums should be based on risk in order to 
provide signals to individuals as to the hazards they face and to encourage them to engage in 
cost-effective mitigation measures to reduce their vulnerability to catastrophes. Risk-based 
premiums should also reflect the cost of capital that insurers need to integrate into their pricing 
to assure adequate return to their investors.  
  The application of Principle 1 provides a clear signal of likely damage to those currently 
residing in areas subject to natural disasters and those who are considering moving into these 
regions. Risk-based premiums would also enable insurers to provide discounts to homeowners 
and businesses that invest in cost-effective loss-reduction mitigation measures. If insurance 
premiums are not risk based, insurers have no economic incentive to offer these discounts. In 
fact, they prefer not to offer coverage to these property owners because it is a losing proposition 
in the long run. 
Principle 2: Dealing with Equity and Affordability Issues. Any special treatment given to 
homeowners currently residing in hazard-prone areas (for example, low-income uninsured or 
inadequately insured homeowners) should come from general public funding and not through 
insurance premium subsidies. 
 Principle  2 reflects a concern for some residents in high-hazard areas who will be faced 
with large premium increases if insurers are permitted to adhere to Principle 1. As discussed in 
the next section, regulations imposed by state insurance commissioners keep premiums in many 
regions subject to hurricane damage artificially lower than the risk-based level.  
  Note that Principle 2 applies only to individuals who currently reside in a hazard-prone 
area. Those who decide to move to the area in the future should be charged premiums that reflect 
the risk. If they were provided with financial assistance from public sources to purchase 
insurance, the resulting public policy would directly encourage development in hazard-prone 
areas and exacerbate the potential for catastrophic losses from future disasters.  
Principle 3: Sufficient Demand for Coverage.  The demand by individuals and firms for 
insurance coverage with risk-based premiums should be sufficiently high so that insurers can 
cover the fixed costs of introducing a program for providing coverage and spreading the risk 
broadly throughout their portfolios.  High demand for insurance would also reduce the level of 
state and federal relief to uninsured or underinsured homeowners in the aftermath of the next 
disaster.  10 
 
Principle 4: Minimize Likelihood of Insolvency.  Insurers and reinsurers should determine how 
much coverage to offer, and what premium to charge against the risk so that the chances of 
insolvency are below some predefined acceptable threshold level.  
  Insurance regulators should play an important role here in assuring that insurers 
providing coverage in high-risk areas have a solid financial basis for doing so. 
 
4.  The Behavioral Challenges: The Demand for Insurance and Mitigation 
How effective can mitigation be in reducing exposure to future disaster? In order to shed some 
light on this question, we undertook an analysis of the impact that mitigation would have on 
reducing losses from hurricanes in four states: Florida, New York, South Carolina and Texas. 
(Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2009). In our analysis of the impact of mitigation, we consider 
two extreme cases: one in which no one has invested in mitigation, the other in which everyone 
has invested in predefined mitigation measures. From the U.S. Hurricane Model developed by 
the catastrophe modeling firm Risk Management Solutions (RMS), losses were calculated on a 
ground up and gross basis, assuming an appropriate mitigation measure across the insured 
portfolio. The mitigation measures were based on various assumptions for the different regions. 
For example, in Florida, the requirements were those defined by the Institute for Business and 
Home Safety’s (IBHS) Fortified ... for Safer Living program. As this program is only for new 
construction, when we describe an analysis using these recommendations, it is the retrofit 
techniques that are aligned with the features of the Fortified program. In New York, South 
Carolina and Texas, mitigation means the application of the latest building codes to the 
residential structures.
11 
  Table 3 indicates the differences in losses and savings from adoption mitigation measures 
for hurricanes with return periods of 100, 250, and 500 years for each of the four states we are 
studying when these loss-reduction measures are in place.  
 
TABLE 3.  MONEY SAVED IN REDUCED LOSSES FROM FULL MITIGATION FOR DIFFERENT RETURN PERIODS 
  100-Year Event  250-Year Event  500-Year Event 
State  Unmitigated 
Losses 
Savings in 
Reduced 
Losses from 
Mitigation ($) 
Savings in 
Reduced 
Losses 
from 
Mitigation  
(%) 
Unmitigated 
Losses 
Savings in 
Reduced 
Losses from 
Mitigation ($) 
Savings in 
Reduced 
Losses 
from 
Mitigation  
(%) 
Unmitigated 
Losses 
Savings in 
Reduced 
Losses from 
Mitigation ($) 
Savings in 
Reduced 
Losses 
from 
Mitigation  
(%) 
FL  $84 billion  $51 billion  61%   $126 billion   $69 billion  55%   $160 billion   $83 billion  52% 
NY  $6 billion  $2 billion  39%   $13 billion   $5 billion  37%   $19 billion   $7 billion  35% 
SC  $4 Billion  $2 billion  44%   $7 billion   $3 billion  41%   $9 billion   $4 billion  39% 
TX  $17 billion  $6 billion  34%   $27 billion   $9 billion  32%   $37 billion   $12 billion  31% 
                                           
11 We are assuming that because these measures are incorporated in building codes they are cost-effective. In other 
words, the discounted long-term expected benefits from the mitigation measure over the projected life of the house 
is greater than its upfront costs.  By obtaining detailed cost estimates for specific mitigation measures incorporated 
in building codes or Florida’s Fortified ... for Safer Living program one could rank their relative cost-effectiveness. 11 
 
  The analyses reveal that mitigation has the potential to significantly reduce losses from 
future hurricanes ranging from 61 percent in Florida for a 100-year return period loss to 31 
percent in the state of New York for a 500-year return period loss. In Florida alone, the use of 
mitigation leads to a $51 billion reduction in losses for a 100-year event and $83 billion for a 
500-year event. These findings are important given the costly capital needed to cover the tail of 
the distribution of extreme events. Adoption of mitigation measures on residential structures 
significantly reduces, if not eliminates, this tail in each of these four states. 
  The challenge, however, lies in making sure residents in hazard-prone areas invest in 
these mitigation measures. Indeed, recent extreme events have highlighted the challenges 
associated with reducing losses from hurricanes and other natural hazards due to what one of us 
has termed the natural disaster syndrome (Kunreuther, 1996). Many homeowners, private 
businesses and public sector organizations do not voluntarily adopt cost-effective loss-reduction 
measures. Hence, these areas are highly vulnerable and unprepared should a severe hurricane or 
other natural disaster occur. The magnitude of the destruction following a catastrophe often leads 
governmental agencies to provide disaster relief to victims even if prior to the event the 
government claimed that it had no intention of doing so. This combination of underinvestment in 
protection prior to the catastrophic event, together with the general taxpayer financing some of 
the recovery can be critiqued on both efficiency and equity grounds.  
  There are a range of informal mechanisms that explain this natural hazard syndrome. One 
relates to framing the problem imperfectly: experts focus on the likelihood and consequences as 
two key elements of the risk. Several studies show, however, that individuals rarely seek out 
probability estimates in making their decisions. When these data are given to them, decision 
makers often do not use the information.  In one study, researchers found that only 22 percent of 
subjects sought out probability information when evaluating several risky managerial decisions. 
People have particular difficulty dealing with probabilistic information for small likelihood 
events. They need a context in which to evaluate the likelihood of an event occurring. They have 
a hard time gauging how concerned to feel about a 1 in 100,000 probability of death without 
some comparison points. Most people just do not know whether 1 in 100,000 is a large risk or a 
small risk. In one study, individuals could not distinguish the relative safety of a chemical plant  
that had an annual chance of experiencing a catastrophic accident that varied from 1 in 10,000 to 
1 in 1 million  (Kunreuther, Novemsky and Kahneman, 2001).  
  There is also evidence that firms and residents tend to ignore risks whose subjective odds 
are seen as falling below some threshold. Prior to a disaster, many individuals perceive its 
likelihood as sufficiently low that they contend it will not happen to me. As a result, they do not 
feel the need to invest voluntarily in protective measures, such as strengthening their house or 
buying insurance. It is only after the disaster occurs that these same individuals express remorse 
that they didn’t undertake protective measures.  
  Another reason that individuals do not invest in protective measures is that they are 
highly myopic and tend to focus on the returns only over the next couple of years. In addition, 
there is extensive experimental evidence showing that human temporal discounting tends to be 
hyperbolic so that events in the distant future are disproportionately discounted relative to 
immediate ones. As an example, people are willing to pay more to have the timing of the receipt 
of a cash prize accelerated from tomorrow to today, than from two days from now to tomorrow 
(Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991). The implication of hyperbolic discounting for mitigation 
decisions is that we are asking residents to invest a tangible fixed sum now to achieve a future 12 
 
benefit that we instinctively undervalue—and one that we, paradoxically, hope never to see at 
all. The effect of placing too much weight on immediate considerations is that the upfront costs 
of mitigation will loom disproportionately large relative to the delayed expected benefits in 
losses over time. 
  There is extensive evidence that residents in hazard-prone areas do not undertake loss-
prevention measures voluntarily. A 1974 survey of more than 1,000 California homeowners in 
earthquake-prone areas revealed that only 12 percent of the respondents had adopted any 
protective measure (Kunreuther et al., 1978). Fifteen years later, there was little change despite 
the increased public awareness of the earthquake hazard. In a 1989 survey of 3,500 homeowners 
in four California counties at risk from earthquakes, only 5 to 9 percent of the respondents in 
these areas reported adopting any loss reduction measures. Palm et al. (1990), Burby et al. (1988) 
and Laska (1991) have found a similar reluctance by residents in flood-prone areas to invest in 
mitigation measures. 
  In the case of flood damage, Burby (2006) provides compelling evidence that actions 
taken by the federal government, such as constructing levees, make residents feel safe, when in 
fact they are still in harm’s way for catastrophes should the levee be breached or overtopped.  
This problem is reinforced by local public officials who do not enforce building codes and/or 
impose land-use regulations to restrict development in high hazard areas. If developers do not 
design homes to be resistant to disasters and individuals do not voluntarily adopt mitigation 
measures, one can expect large scale losses following a catastrophic event, as evidenced by the 
property damage to New Orleans caused by Hurricane Katrina. 
  Even after the devastating 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, a large number of residents 
had still not invested in relatively inexpensive loss-reduction measures with respect to their 
property, nor had they undertaken emergency preparedness measures. A survey of 1,100 adults 
living along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts undertaken in May 2006 revealed that 83 percent of the 
responders had taken no steps to fortify their home, 68 percent had no hurricane survival kit and 
60 percent had no family disaster plan. (Goodnough, 2006). The fact that homeowners do not 
necessarily invest in cost-effective mitigation measures nor purchase adequate insurance 
coverage on their own if not required to do so, should not simply be considered irrational. As we 
just discussed, people might have their own reasons for not taking these actions until after the 
next disaster occurs. We thus turn to the need for long-term contracts to address these issues.  
 
5.  A New Concept: The Development of Long-Term Insurance Contracts 
We propose moving from the standard one-year insurance contracts for homeowners’ and flood 
insurance for residential properties to long-term insurance (“LTI” hereafter) so as to encourage 
property owners to invest in cost-effective mitigation measures.
12 In the case of homeowners 
coverage (which includes protection against the effects of wind damage, but not flood losses), 
some insurers have recently restricted the sale of new homeowners’ policies in hurricane prone 
areas. Policyholders cannot help but worry that their existing coverage might be subject to 
unexpected cancellation or very significant premium increases, particularly if there is severe 
hurricane damage in the near future.  
                                           
12 This section draws heavily on Jaffee, Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2008). 13 
 
Need for Long-Term Insurance Short-term insurance policies foster significant social costs. 
Evidence from recent disasters reveals that consumers who fail to adequately protect their home 
or even insure at all, create a welfare cost to themselves and a possible cost to all taxpayers in the 
form of government disaster assistance. Under the current U.S. system, the governor of the 
state(s) can request that the president declare a “major disaster” and offer special assistance if the 
damage is severe enough. The number of presidential disaster declarations has dramatically 
increased over the past 50 years: there had been 162 during the period 1955-1965, 282 during 
1966 to 1975, 319 from 1986 to1995, and 545 from 1996 to 2005 (Michel-Kerjan, 2008).  
  The development of LTI should also encourage individuals to invest in cost-effective 
mitigation measures. As pointed out above, many homeowners do not invest in such measures 
due to myopia and budget constraints. They are unwilling to incur the high upfront cost 
associated with these investments relative to the small premium discount they would receive the 
following year which reflects the expected reduction in annual insured losses (Kunreuther, 
Meyer and Michel-Kerjan, 2009). If an LTI policy were coupled with a long-term home 
improvement loan tied to the mortgage, the reduction in insurance premiums would exceed the 
annual loan payment. The social welfare benefits of LTI coupled with long-term mitigation loans 
over N years could be significant: there will be less damage to property, reduction in costs of 
protection against catastrophic losses by insurers, more secure mortgages and lower costs to the 
government for disaster assistance. 
 
Why Does a Market for Long-Term Insurance Not Exist Today? In his seminal work on 
uncertainty and welfare economics, Kenneth Arrow defined “the absence of marketability for an 
action which is identifiable, technologically possible and capable of influencing some 
individuals’ welfare (…) as a failure of the existing market to provide a means whereby the 
services can be both offered and demanded upon the payment of a price.” (Arrow, 1963). Here 
we shall discuss several factors which have contributed to the non-marketability of LTI for 
protecting homeowners’ property against losses from fire, theft and large-scale natural disasters. 
We discuss elements which affect both the supply and demand sides.  
Supply Side. Today, due to political pressure, insurance rates are frequently restricted to be 
artificially low in hazard-prone areas, as illustrated by Florida’s actions in recent years. The 
result is that the risks most subject to catastrophic losses also become the most unattractive for 
insurers to market. A second stumbling block, derived from premium regulation, is that insurers 
are unclear as to how much they will be allowed to charge in the future.  Uncertainty regarding 
costs of capital and changes in risk over time may also deter insurers from providing long-term 
insurance. In principle, of course, insurers could add a component in their premiums to account 
for the costs created by these factors. The problem is that the insurance regulator, presumed to be 
representing consumers’ interests, may not allow these costs to be embedded in the approved 
premiums. Furthermore, it is unclear what the voluntary demand for coverage will be, given the 
resulting premiums. In a real sense, a new and less intrusive format for government regulation of 
insurance markets may be required if the private sector is to be successful in dealing with time-
varying risks and capital costs.  
  Insurers might also be concerned about possible changes in the level of risk over time. 
For example, global warming could trigger more intense weather-related disasters, and/or local 
environmental degradation might change the risk landscape in the next several decades. One way 
to address this concern would be to have renegotiable contracts every X years based on new 14 
 
information validated by the scientific community in much the same way that there are 
renegotiable loans with adjustable rates.  
Demand Side. Some homeowners may worry about the financial solvency of their insurer over a 
long period, particularly if they have the feeling they would be locked-in if they sign an LTI 
contract. Consumers might also fear being overcharged if insurers set premiums that reflect the 
uncertainty associated with long-term risks. Furthermore, those who have not suffered a loss for 
10 years but have a 25-year LTI may feel that the premiums are unfairly priced. It is thus 
essential that the design of an LTI contract anticipates these concerns and be transparent to the 
policyholder.  
 
Developing an LTI Policy. Jaffee, Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2008) have developed a 
simple two-period model in a competitive market setting where premiums reflect risk to compare 
the expected benefits of annual contracts versus LTI. The authors show that an LTI policy 
reduces the marketing costs for insurers compared with 1-period policies, and also reduces the 
search costs to the consumer if their insurer decides to cancel its policy at the end of period 1.  If 
one permits the policyholder to cancel an LTI policy at the end of period 1 if he learns that the 
cost of a 1-period policy is sufficiently low to justify paying a cancellation cost (C), then it is 
always optimal for the insurer to offer an LTI policy, and for a consumer to purchase one. The 
insurer will set C at a level which enables it break even on those policies that are canceled before 
the maturity date. We should note that if one is going to develop any type of LTI policy that 
would be marketed by the private sector, then premiums need to reflect risk (Principle 1). By 
giving insurers the freedom to charge prices that enable them to break even, they will have 
incentives to develop new products. Under the current state regulatory arrangements where many 
insurance commissioners have limited insurers’ ability to charge risk-based premiums in hazard-
prone areas, no insurance company would even entertain the possibility of marketing an LTI 
policy. They would be concerned that the regulator would clamp down on them now or in the 
future regarding what price they could charge, so that a long-term contract would be infeasible 
from a financial point of view.  
 
6. A Natural Candidate for Long-Term Insurance: Flood Insurance through the NFIP 
Given the existing tension between state insurance regulators and the insurance industry, we feel 
that it is best politically to introduce LTI by focusing on flood insurance since this coverage is 
provided by the federal government.
13 The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was 
created in 1968 as a result of the refusal by insurers to cover this risk because they viewed it as 
uninsurable. In 2007, the NFIP sold over 5.5 million policies (compared to 2.5 million in 1992) 
and covered over $1.1 trillion in assets (compared to only $237 billion in 1992). These figures 
were stable in 2008. Given that the NFIP is up for renewal in Congress in September 2009, there 
may be a window for change in the coming months.  
It would be useful to consider whether one could make flood insurance policies long-term 
by tying them to mortgages. By instituting such a program, insurance would be connected 
directly to the property, rather than to the homeowner. One might also consider requiring 
everyone in flood-prone areas to take out the insurance, just as those who own a car are required 
                                           
13 For more details on the National Flood Insurance Program see the paper by Mark Brown prepared for this 
conference.  15 
 
to take out automobile insurance today whether or not they are financing the purchase of their 
car. If a homeowner moved to another location, the flood insurance policy would remain with the 
property. 
 
Why Have a Long-Term Flood Insurance Policy? A long-term flood insurance program would 
offer homeowners currently residing in flood-prone areas a fixed rate for a fixed period of time 
(for example, 5, 10 or 20 years). If the homeowner moved away from the area before the end of 
the policy period, then the insurance policy would automatically be transferred to the new 
property owner at the same rate. For those homeowners who were being charged subsidized rates 
because their homes were constructed prior to the time that their community joined the NFIP, 
these rates would be maintained for the length of the policy period. For homeowners who 
constructed homes after the date that their community joined the program, their rates would be 
actuarially based.   
There are a number of reasons why such a long-term flood insurance policy would be a 
great improvement over the current annual policies from the perspective of the relevant 
stakeholders: homeowners, FEMA, banks and financial institutions and the general taxpayer. By 
fixing flood insurance rates at a fixed price, homeowners would be provided with financial 
stability. They would also have knowledge that they are protected against water damage from 
floods and hurricanes. This would reduce the legal problems that have stemmed from recent 
hurricanes (Florida hurricanes of 2004, Katrina, Ike). Homeowners would not have to argue that 
the losses were due to wind so they could collect on their homeowners’ policy. 
Long-term flood insurance would also assure the spread of risk within the program since 
most homeowners in flood-prone areas would be covered. If flood insurance were required for 
all homeowners residing in hazard-prone areas, then there would be even a larger spread of risk. 
This would provide much needed financial revenue for the program over time by having a much 
larger policy base than is currently available. 
  Long-term policies would prevent individuals from cancelling their policies after they 
have not experienced a flood for several years. Presently, some individuals cancel their policies, 
even if they are required to purchase the policy as a condition for a federally insured mortgage. 
The banks and financial institutions have often not enforced this regulation because few of them 
have been fined and/or the mortgages are transferred to banks in non-flood prone regions of the 
country that have not focused on either the flood hazard risk or the requirement that homeowners 
may have to purchase this coverage. Consider the flood in August 1998 that damaged property in 
northern Vermont. Of the 1549 victims of this disaster, FEMA found 84 percent of the 
homeowners in Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs) did not have insurance, even though 45 
percent of these individuals were required to purchase this coverage. (Tobin and Calfee, 2005) 
  If long-term loans for mitigation were offered by banks, then individuals with long-term 
flood insurance policies would be encouraged to invest in cost-effective risk reduction measures. 
To highlight this point, consider the following simple example. Suppose a property owner could 
invest $1,500 to flood proof his home so as to reduce the water damage by $30,000 from a future 
flood or hurricane with an annual probability of 1 in 100. The NFIP should be willing to reduce 
the annual premium by $300 (that is, 1/100 x $30,000) to reflect the lower expected losses that 
would occur if a flood or hurricane hit the area in which the policyholder was residing. If the 
house was expected to last for 10 or more years, the net present value of the expected benefit of 16 
 
investing in this measure would exceed the upfront cost at an annual discount rate as high as 15 
percent.  
  Today, many property owners would be reluctant to incur the $1,500 expenditure, 
because they would get only $300 back next year and are likely to only consider the benefits 
over the next few years when making their decisions. If they underweight the future, the 
expected discounted benefits would likely be less than the $1,500 upfront costs. In addition, 
budget constraints could discourage them from investing in the mitigation measure. Other 
considerations would also play a role in a family’s decision not to invest in these measures. The 
family may not be certain how long they will reside in the house and/or whether their insurer 
would reward them again when their policy is renewed. There may also be a failure to appreciate 
the interdependencies associated with floods, earthquakes and other disasters. More specifically, 
by investing in mitigation measures, one will not only reduce the potential losses to one’s own 
property but alleviate damage to neighboring structures. 
  If a 20 year flood insurance policy were tied to the property, then the homeowner could 
take out a 20-year $1,500 home improvement loan linked to the mortgage at an annual interest 
rate of 10 percent, resulting in payments of $145 per year. If the insurance premium was reduced 
by $300, the savings to the homeowner each year would be $155. Alternatively, this loan could 
be incorporated as part of the mortgage at even a lower interest rate than 10 percent. 
Long-term insurance and mitigation loans would constitute new financial products. A bank 
would have a financial incentive to provide this type of loan, since it is now better protected 
against a catastrophic loss to the property, and the NFIP knows that its potential loss from a 
major disaster is reduced. Moreover, the general public will now be less likely to have large 
amounts of their tax dollars going for disaster relief. Indeed, prior to the 2005 hurricane season, 
which inflicted nearly $18 billion in flood claims, the NFIP had a cumulative deficit of about $3 
billion after 37 years of operation (Michel-Kerjan and Kousky, 2009). A win-win-win-win 
situation for all!  
 
7. Conclusion  
Since the 1990s, we have witnessed a series of large-scale catastrophes that have inflicted 
historical economic and insured losses. Half of the 20 most costly insured catastrophes between 
1970 and 2007 occurred since 2001, and all were natural disasters except for the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. The United States has been particularly challenged because nine of these 20 disasters for 
insurance occurred in this country. The growing concentration of population and structures in 
high-risk areas, combined with the potential consequences of global warming, are likely to lead 
to even more devastating catastrophes in the coming years unless cost-effective risk reduction 
measures are put in place. 
  The challenge facing the United States, and many other countries, is how to encourage 
residents and businesses to invest in loss-reduction measures and insurance in advance of a 
disaster so as to avoid the large-scale governmental disaster relief that will be provided after a 
catastrophe occurs. Indeed, even when risk reduction measures are available and are cost-
effective, many people are still not investing in them. Following a disaster government agencies 
provide assistance to the area. We term this the natural disaster syndrome. 17 
 
The past few years have provided additional empirical evidence supporting the natural 
disaster syndrome. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina many victims suffered severe losses 
from flooding because they had not mitigated their homes and did not have flood insurance to 
cover the resulting damage. As a result, an unprecedented level of federal disaster assistance was 
provided to these victims and the affected communities. There are many reasons why those in 
harm’s way have not undertaken protective measures in advance of disaster. Many individuals 
believe that the event will not happen to them. In the case of New Orleans, some residents may 
have felt that they were fully protected by flood control measures such as the levees.
14 This has 
led to increased development in hazard-prone areas without appropriate land-use regulations and 
well-enforced building codes. In addition, budget constraints and short time horizons may limit 
people’s ability and interest to invest in hazard mitigation measures and to purchase insurance. 
Such a dynamic has been observed in many countries around the world. 
We propose a new initiative that could address these issues: long-term insurance contracts 
coupled with long-term loans for encouraging the adoption of cost-effective mitigation measures 
and providing stability to homeowners. Given the benefits and potential difficulties in 
implementing such a program, we conclude that flood insurance would be a natural candidate for 
such a long-term program. Given that the NFIP is up for renewal in September 2009, there may 
be a political will to develop more effective solutions.  
As the 2007 Economic Report of the President stated, “Insurance plays a vital role in 
America’s economy by helping households and businesses manage risks. (…) When insurance 
prices reflect underlying economic costs they can encourage a more efficient allocation of 
resources. Efforts to keep premiums for insurance against catastrophe hazards artificially low, 
whether through regulation or through subsidized government programs, can encourage 
excessively risky behavior on the part of those who might be affected by future catastrophes.” It 
is fair to say that two years after its publication, this federal will has not be translated into state 
and local actions. 
There is an opportunity for the Obama Administration and the U.S. Congress to take steps 
now to reduce these losses and protect the Nation against extreme events in a more systematic 
way than we have to date. We need a more coherent national strategy for managing these risks in 
a new era of catastrophes. 
                                           
14 FEMA clearly thought that the levees would provide this protection. Otherwise they would have designated the 
Lower Ninth Ward as a hazard-prone area and residents would have been eligible for flood insurance. 18 
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